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MR. BORK INQUIRES INTO THE ORIGIN 
AND NATURE OF PERMISSIVENESS 
Lyle Denniston* 
THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE PoLmCAL SEDUCTION OF THE 
LA w. By Robert H. Bork New York: The Free Press/Macmillan. 
1990. Pp. xiv, 432. $22.50. 
Robert H. Bork's restless spirit has agitated the American legal 
community for more than a generation, and this book seems certain to 
assure that that will continue. The Tempting of America is a testament 
to what has been apparent for years to those who have followed Bork's 
interesting, ambitious career - that is, that he is in love with the law, 
and that he hates the law: he loves its nearly limitless creative pos-
sibilities, but he hates what others - especially academics - do with 
those possibilities. He always has looked to the law as an engine of 
advancement for his own career, and for his own ideas about what 
society's ordering arrangements should be and should do. But he has 
come, especially in more recent times, to a rude, even coarse intoler-
ance of what the law has done for the careers of others, those who are 
of different instincts, imagination, and morality, and to a similar intol-
erance of what the law so often has been declared authoritatively to be. 
In the arenas of intellectual and professional combat over the law 
that have been most important to Bork - the academy and the courts 
- he has been an energetic battler, but he has not often been able to 
declare himself the winner in the simplistic way that he apparently 
would like: he has not been able to control the outcomes, and, as a 
result, he has seen the law go off in directions that have made him 
deeply uncomfortable (and, seemingly, sorely afraid that things might 
never be different). This book was intended to be a treatment of that 
struggle, in what Bork surely must have hoped would be scholarly and 
convincing terms. But this book bespeaks such a seething anger, such 
a scalding fit of temper, and such a soaring arrogance that it is -
finally - very hard to take seriously as scholarship, and it is even 
somewhat difficult to take with complete seriousness as public 
discourse. 1 
* Supreme Court reporter, The Baltimore Sun; Contributing Editor and columnist, Ameri-
can Lawyer magazine; Adjunct Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center. A.B. 
1955, University of Nebraska; M.A. 1957, Georgetown University. - Ed. 
1. The excesses of the book, understandably, have cheered his dedicated followers, who for 
some time have believed in the fundamental political necessity of raising their voices about the 
course of American consitutional history. Declares cheerleader Patrick B. McGuigan: "This 
book will change the course of history." McGuigan, Book Review Essay: Bob Bork's America, 
1291 
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The law can be, and very often is, discussed with passion and with 
intensity, and the debate is enriched, not diminished, by that. This 
book most assuredly is passionate. It is fully capable of exciting and 
arousing what Bork sees very plainly as the other side in the struggle; 
it cajoles, it taunts, it even goads. And if it were confined to that, one 
could read it with delight and discovery. But Robert Bork is not con-
tent to stop at provocative stimulation. He is so enamored of his own 
rectitude that he seems to be saying that it would make no difference 
whether there were another side willing to engage him. Bork seems 
prepared only to declare, not to persuade. If the debate about what 
American law is, and what it ought to become, is to continue in any 
meaningful way, there simply must be some underlying, even if un-
stated, understanding that all of the right does not necessarily lie on 
one side, and that the other side, however wrongheaded its assertions 
may seem, is animated by good will and sincere purpose. Such an 
understanding clearly is foreign to this book. One hopes that it is not 
entirely foreign to Robert Bork. 
It would be easy, perhaps even tempting, to subject this book and 
its author to a dose of pop psychoanalysis and find in them only the 
residue of deep anger and resentment produced by Bork's ignominious 
defeat in 1987 as a nominee for the U.S. Supreme Court - a defeat, 
painful enough in itself, made more acutely hurtful by coming in a 
year of what was supposed to have been nationwide constitutional cel-
ebration, combined with the final triumph of what might be called 
"Reagan jurisprudence" at the Court. Knowing how long Bork had 
been imagining himself to be an Associate Justice, and how inevitable 
an entire generation of Court-watching journalists had made that seem 
to be, Bork could be forgiven for his thoroughly genuine wonderment 
at the final fall, and he could even be forgiven for believing (as he does) 
that it was done to him solely by a huge conspiracy of the Left. In 
short, he was angry enough then to write a book such as this one. 
(Indeed, audiences that have heard him on the speaker's circuit lately 
know well that the anger has not diminished one whit in the more 
than two years since.) 
But it will not do to try to explain this book that way. This is what 
Bork has been waiting to say (or has been saying piecemeal) for years 
and years. The ideas had been in gestation long before Bork's nomina-
tion to the Court, years before even the intelligentsia in Washington 
FAM., L. & DEMOCRACY REP. Jan. 1990, at 6, 8. Finding it to be a volume of"wit and percep· 
tion," thus turning its emotional hyperbole into subtle virtues, McGuigan predicts that the book 
will convince increasing numbers of Americans that Robert Heron Bork is one of the giants 
of our era - in many ways the closest thing we have in this generation to James Madison. 
Bob Bork is a uniquely American character, the intellectual former Marine who stood for us 
in the pass at Thermopylae, buying time so we might prepare the legal defenses, and even 
make careful plans for constitutional restoration. 
Id. at 8. 
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had bothered to pay any serious attention to "originalism" as constitu-
tional theory, years before Bork would emerge from the groves of 
learning to make his claim to be taken seriously in the public domain 
as a constitutional scholar. After reading this book, one is inclined to 
think that this is what those who fought his nomination to the Court 
would have said they were really fighting against, had they become as 
familiar with Bork then as this one volume would have made them. 
Then, his challengers had relied upon fifteen years of prior (and not 
always relevant) writings. This book, in a way, tends to validate what 
happened in the Senate and in the political community outside the 
Senate, because it moves beyond all of the tactics of Media Age polit-
ical hype and manipulation used against him2 and puts the focus 
squarely where Bork had wanted it all along - on his manner, his 
ideas, and his agenda. This revelation of the real Bork, in his own 
words, would have served the opposition as nothing it had gathered 
before did or could have. This is a manifesto, a summons, an aching 
plea for America to see the law as Bork insists that it must be seen, but 
it ultimately becomes an unintended explanation of why he is not now 
on the Court. (Indeed, this book is vastly more revealing even than 
Bork's personal, televised testimony before the Senate Judiciary Com-
mittee, because the courtesies required there - and his own attempt at 
self-restraint to improve his confirmation chances - masked the full 
measure of his views and, even more importantly, largely obscured the 
nature of his difficult personality.) 
It is simplistic to see The Tempting of America as no more than a 
tome about "originalism," and, if it were only that, it would be mind-
less (as well as quite out of date) to criticize it. In this era of the 
"Rehnquist Court" (or, to put it more accurately so as to pinpoint that 
institution's true present character, the "Scalia Court"), there is no 
sense pretending that "originalism" was at stake in the Bork nomina-
tion and went down with it, as some of Bork's detractors seem to be-
lieve (and as some of the anxious sentiments in this book might imply). 
"Originalism" will continue to be the emergent, and frequently the 
dominant, jurisprudential approach of the Court at least through the 
remaining days of its present membership and, very likely, well be-
yond. And, indeed, there is no reason to act as if "originalism" were 
bad stuff just because Bork espoused a version of it (or just because 
former Attorney General Edwin Meese said he, too, was for it). It is 
purely respectable constitutional theory, and it can be both interesting 
and compelling. The search for what the Framers had in mind -
especially, what they ordained as the structure of American constitu-
2. For a revealing (if undramatic) look behind the scenes of the opposition to Bork, see M. 
PERTSCHUK & W. SCHAETZEL, THE PEOPLE RlslNG: THE CAMPAIGN AGAINST THE BORK 
NOMINATION (1989); see also Ethan Bronner's readable account, Battle for Justice: How the 
Bork Nomination Shook America, which is reviewed by Professor Terrance Sandalow in this 
issue. 
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tional government - and a keenness on being faithful to the mandates 
which that search reveals, ought to be some part of every judge's ma-
chinery of constitutional interpretation. 
It is possible, moreover, to argue "originalism" without being ill-
humored about it. Antonin Scalia does that much of the time; indeed, 
Scalia's use of that theory as the ground for a constitutional decision is 
often an intellectual delight to behold. In this regard, one recalls, 
readily, his opinion in Michael H. v. Gerald D., 3 a declaration well 
worth studying for its articulation of theory, no matter how one may 
feel about the specific result. (Scalia, of course, has been known to lose 
his temper when confronted by a stubborn refusal by a colleague to 
embrace a particular "originalist" result, 4 but that is quite uncommon; 
his usual tactic with those who remain unconvinced by his argument is 
to resort to quite agreeable sarcasm.) 
Bork's treatment of "originalism" in this book is, in some ways, 
cleverly disarming. As he summarizes that theory in Chapter Seven, 
he is logical and even quite convincing about it (pp. 143-53). Of 
course, one must look past the unpleasantly argumentative tone, but 
that is fairly easy to do - at least in this chapter. The full flavor of 
Bork's "originalism" and its total saturation with his strained sense of 
personal morality and social propriety become plain, however, only 
when he undertakes to discuss alternative theories of constitutional 
interpretation, and then assigns to them the blame for the moral mal-
aise he sees infecting the nation. It is only when the reader confronts 
Bork's entire discussion that his moral agenda stands out starkly; only 
then does the "temptation" theme take on the real meaning Bork in-
tended for it. 
Thus, what distinguishes Bork as an "originalist" is what distin-
guishes this book: it combines a closed system of antique moralizing 
(disguised in a respectable costume of eighteenth-century constitu-
tional finery) with a snide, dyspeptic denunciation of nearly the entire 
history of American constitutional jurisprudence and of anyone who 
might be prepared to apologize for it. Anyone who came away from 
the public fight over Bork's nomination to the Court with the sense 
that he was simply discontent with the outcomes declared by the 
3. 109 S. Ct. 2333 (1989) (divided Supreme Court upheld against due process challenge of 
putative natural father, and due process and equal protection challenges of child, a California 
statute creating presumption that a child born to a married woman was the child of the marriage 
if, at the time of the birth, the woman was living with her husband). 
4. Scalia's scathing denunciation of Justice O'Connor in Webster v. Reproductive Health 
Servs., 109 S. Ct. 3040, 3064-67 (1989), was a kind of Borkian intolerance run riot. Although 
Bork does not say so in his book, one may assume that he would have approved of Scalia's 
attack, so rabid is Bork in his hostility to Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). Says he in the book: 
"[N]o one, however pro-abortion, has ever thought of an argument that even remotely begins to 
justify Roe v. Wade as a constitutional decision .... [T]he decision was the assumption of illegiti-
mate judicial power and a usurpation of the democratic authority of the American people." Pp. 
115-16. 
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"Warren Court" or was simply out of the present-day constitutional 
"mainstream" must read this book to see, with utter clarity, how 
deeply Bork is persuaded that almost no one else, ever, has gotten the 
Constitution right. 5 But what is even more astonishing about this 
book is its overheated Know-Nothingism: anyone who would dare to 
speculate, afresh, about the meaning of the Constitution is found, by 
that fact alone, to be propagating illegitimacy. Chapter Twelve, for 
example, declares hyperbolically in its heading The Impossibility of All 
Theories that Depart from Original Understanding (p. 251 ), and Bork 
smugly declares a few pages later his "firm intention to give up reading 
this literature" of alternative theory (p. 255). Bork's attack on crea-
tive learning and speculation, on intellectual endeavor, would do 
credit in its brutishness to a stevedore or a "redneck." 
Indeed, the reader is almost embarrassed by the opening pages of 
the core of the book, dealing with theory (pp. 133-38), where Bork 
foolishly suggests that the mere volume of constitutional theorizing 
alone tends to prove that all of it must be unworthy. "Self-confident 
legal institutions," he says, "do not require so much talking about. If 
this is so, then the rising flood of innovative theories signifies not the 
health of scholarship and constitutionalism but rather a deep-seated 
malaise and, quite possibly, a state of approaching decadence" (p. 
133). A "redneck" would not put it that way, but would surely agree 
if that same thought, that the expenditure of intellectual energy is a 
hedonistic endeavor, were put in homelier terms. In fact, like so many 
passages in the book, that one, with its choice of words and negative 
imagery, is deeply telling. The word "decadence" is the most telling of 
all. Its use helps to resolve an early riddle that the reader confronts -
a riddle which simply must be solved before this book's essence be-
comes clear. 
As the reader moves into The Tempting of America, a disquieting 
sense begins to develop. The acerbic tone is a problem, a very serious 
problem. And the fundamental premise of the book - that American 
law has been "seduced" by politics - has a little too strong a hint of 
peekaboo smut to it, especially when that theme is warmly exploited, 
page after page. The combination is troubling, but it is not immedi-
ately clear why. Sensing a creeping discomfort, the reader starts to 
wonder, is it because I am reacting to the sound of this, or to the 
substance? One gets the idea, in the very first pages of the introduc-
5. Bork's grievance goes all the way back to 1798, and Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. 386 (1798). 
Preparing to denounce Samuel Chase, Bork begins chapter 1 thus: "The Constitution was barely 
in place when one Justice of the Supreme Court cast covetous glances at the apple that would 
eventually cause the fall." P. 19. (The imagery of sexual temptation, of course, begins at the 
beginning for Bork.) Even the great John Marshall does not escape Bork's punishing lash. The 
gestures of complaint are less harsh and shrill, but the message nonetheless emerges: Marshall 
could not cut it either. Pp. 20-28. 
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tion, 6 that Bork is unburdening himself of gut feelings as well as 
thoughts about morality, and his reactions and declarations seem to 
deal with a kind of pinched morality - a vague disquiet over the re-
laxation of traditional taboos which govern behavior and conduct. 
Victorian rigidity?, the reader speculates. Is temptation, by definition, 
a sin - especially when it is temptation discussed in the vernacular of 
sexuality? In time, that kind of speculation proves to be close to the 
reality of this book's evangelical message: this is Elmer Gantry gone 
to court, preaching in apocalyptic terms of constitutional hellfire and 
damnation. The old ways of the law were good enough for our grand-
parents, Bork seems to say, so why not leave all learning about the law 
well enough alone? 
Bork's pervasive message becomes clear and bold: he is talking 
about "moral relativism" (p. 246), and how the courts are to blame for 
that (as the sometimes willing, sometimes unwitting captives of the 
loose morality of the Left, originating among the "modem liberal 
elites" (p. 214), especially in the demonstrably decadent law schools). 
His entire argument about the proper way for courts to interpret the 
law is not, in the end, an argument for a preferred structural arrange-
ment originating in the Constitution. Rather, it is Bork's relief as he 
contemplates a day when "almost unlimited personal autonomy" (p. 
249) and "rampant individualism" (p. 246) are held in check by the 
electorally sensitive legislature, left alone by the courts. 
The emotional and ideological heart of this book is located in the 
mere ten pages (pp. 241-50) of Chapter Eleven, Of Mora/ism, Moral 
Relativism, and the Constitution. 7 There, he dissects "a powerful 
American subculture whose opinions differ markedly from those of 
most Americans" (p. 241 ), "a unified adversarial culture within our 
general culture" (p. 245 n. *), which embraces values borne of "egalita-
rian or redistributionist ethos" (p. 245). Yet perhaps its worst sin is 
that this "segment of our culture emphatically denies the right of ma-
jorities to regulate abortion, homosexual conduct, pornography, or 
even the use of narcotics in the home" (p. 245). The reader's memory 
runs quickly to the political adoration of "Middle America" as the 
source of right-thinking values which contrasts so vividly with Eastern 
or Californian cultures, with their "me-ism" and other hedonistic ex-
6. Before reading two pages into the introduction, the reader has encountered such phrases 
as these: "the moment of temptation is the moment of choice" (p. 1), "[t]o give in to temptation" 
(p. 1), "the song of the tempters" (p. 2). 
7. An admirer of this book, Washington Post Writers Group columnist Edwin M. Yoder, Jr., 
has suggested that Bork's attack on "the cultural and moral relativists" is "the least persuasive 
strand of what is otherwise a compelling argument." Yoder, Robert Bork: The Trouble With the 
Law, Wash. Post, Nov. 19, 1989, Book World, at 3, col. 1. Yoder, one of journalism's most 
distinguished and gifted analysts of the Court, is certainly right about that. But he is totally 
wrong in suggesting further that this strand "is not exactly essential to Bork's theory of jurispru· 
dence." Id. The entire structure of Bork's argument about political "seduction" of the law is 
built upon these moral perceptions, and, for Bork, they alone give "originalism" its essence. 
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cesses; some readers, too, will be reminded of George Bush's fear-
mongering preachments during the 1988 presidential campaign 
against the American Civil Liberties Union and that "L" word. 8 
There is much in this book, explicitly and between the lines, about 
the grand division of America into camps of Left and Right; Bork 
spells it out very directly on one of the concluding pages. That divi-
sion is perceived to be a "war in both our legal and general culture" 
that will continue to be waged, with "more blood at the crossroads 
where law and politics meet" (p. 343). The language is political or 
martial, but the message, fundamentally, is that of morals, and Bork 
can be heard repeatedly - above the subtlety of theoretical constitu-
tional expression - summoning his followers to a holy war~ Yet he 
disingenuously seeks to suggest that the fight in the Senate was not 
about him but rather centered on "the issue of whether the Court 
would become dominated by the neutral philosophy of original under-
standing and thus decisively end its long enlistment on one side of the 
war in our culture" (p. 343). 
To Bork, his brand of "originalism" is neutral in character only 
because he insists that it is devoid of moral preference. But the degree 
to which he insists upon judicial abdication - a renunciation of con-
stitutional authority that is breathtaking in its scope - suggests that 
he is only troubled about the moral preferences which courts have 
chosen (really, throughout American history) and yearns for the rees-
tablishment of traditionalist values in representative assemblies. 
An unarticulated premise of Bork's whole approach is that judges 
and courts have no accountability, moral or otherwise, for the real 
consequences which emerge from acts of legislatures or the executive 
in the face of determined judicial abstinence or abdication. Yet, law 
itself may be thought of as an abiding moral expression, and it is 
brought to bear frequently, one supposes, precisely because there are 
some ultimate questions upon which the political winds cannot be 
trusted to blow fairly. To tum a constitutional question presented for 
decision into a political question, by perverse avoidance, is almost to 
invite trifling with the moral expression in law. A judge who refuses 
to use judicial authority, especially constitutional authority, which 
does exist (even if its existence is an arguable proposition) is a judge 
who has made a choice to let known or at least predictable conse-
quences flow elsewhere in the governmental structure - that is, conse-
quences flowing from democratically elected and accountable 
legislatures. It is simply choice by another name,9 and Bork cannot 
pretend that it is not a choice at all merely because he, as a theorist, 
8. Not surprisingly, the ACLU comes in for some explicit denunciation by Bork for its cen-
tral role in the "left-liberal culture." Pp. 243-45. 
9. Has any serious student of the law, or of morals, ever sought to argue, for example, that 
the mythical Justice Tatting made no moral election whatsoever when his astonishing abdication 
from decision in The Case of the Speluncean Explorers, meant a 3-3 tie, thereby allowing Profes-
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would contend that the particular use of the power would have been 
illegitimate. Consequences follow the choice to withhold judicial au-
thority, as they do all choices. 10 
Robert Bork, the "originalist," steps out of this book as a stiffly 
proper, hard-shell, fundamental moral literalist who harangues the 
courts for having cheated America of her innocence. He is unable to 
disguise, behind constitutional theory, his passionate desire that legis-
lators be left free to take whatever steps they deem appropriate to reg-
ulate some of the most intimate and private activities of human life, 
with no check save the quite remote possibility that an electoral major-
ity might somehow grow disgruntled with the enactment of its very 
own value system! Thus, for him to analyze "originalism" by his defi-
nition as if he were guided by neutral moral preferences is to oversim-
plify so extravagantly as to tax the reader's credulity. 
Simplistic reasoning, in fact, is quite notably a main feature of this 
book. Subtleties or gradations in constitutional thinking are made to 
disappear in the Borkian world, as everything gets cut along a hard 
and fast line of separation - essentially, his constitutional system ver-
sus virtually everyone else's. The "cultural war" most clearly de-
scribed in this book is not, as he suggests, between the Left and 
"originalists," or even between constitutional Good and Evil. Rather, 
the war is between Bork and decade upon decade of established consti-
tutional history, which is subjected repeatedly to pained and even 
shrill complaint. 
The constitutional system on his side of that war is shown to be 
essentially closed, one in which he alone writes the rules and the defi-
nitions. He tosses off declarations, in tones of profundity, which tum 
out - upon close examination - to be mere prejudices, made to suit 
his moral and political notions. For example, he pontificates that "one 
thing our constitutional orthodoxy does not countenance is a judiciary 
that decides for itself when and how it will make national policy, when 
and to what extent it will displace executives and legislators as our 
governors" (p. 153). Notice the way in which thoroughly debatable 
propositions become unarguable conclusions by mere declaration: 
sor Lon Fuller's four explorers to be put to death for murder? Fuller, The Case of the Spe/uncea11 
Explorers, 62 HARV. L. REV. 616, 626-31 (1949). 
10. One wonders how many guffaws or snickers were heard privately in the lobbies of the 
Louisiana legislature when the anti-abortion bloc there - probably the most militant in any 
legislature in the nation - heard of Chief Justice William Rehnquist's reassuring comments, in 
Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 109 S. Ct. 3040 (1989), that the Court's partial with-
drawal of constitutional protection for abortion rights was not an invitation for the enactment of 
"abortion regulation reminiscent of the dark ages." 109 S. Ct. at 3058. Within the very week 
after the Webster decision, the Louisiana Legislature told district attorneys across that state to 
begin enforcing an 1855 law which banned abortions in all circumstances, even to save the life of 
a pregnant woman - a law that had been enjoined as unconstitutional since 1976. See Marcus, 
Louisiana Moves Against Abortion, N.Y. Times, July 8, 1989, at A7, col. 4. (The effort faltered in 
the first test case, Weeks v. Connick, Civil Actions 73-469, 74-2425, 74-3197 (E.D. La. Jan. 23, 
1990) (Westlaw, Unreported Dist. Ct. Cases). 
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"decides for itself," "make national policy," "displace ... our gover-
nors." It is easy to win an argument when one undertakes coura-
geously to slaughter defenseless strawmen. But that is not 
scholarship; it is not even fair debate. 
It surely is not the least arrogance on display in this book that 
Bork suggests that all constitutional adjudication must be based upon 
a complete philosophical system (and, of course, his system alone is 
free of error). The case he seeks to make for a wholesale withdrawal 
of judicial power to interpret the Constitution rests entirely upon the 
need for a unitary constitutional principle, incapable of growth and 
maturation, enduring (one supposes that he thinks it is eternal), un-
changeable. The severity - nay, the impossibility - of that proposi-
tion in an open and changing society is manifest. His longing for a 
constitutional yesterday that, in fact, may never have existed in 
America drives Bork to this desperate end. It is, surely, quite a fall. 
